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In their stimulating and valuable article,' Blumstein, Bovbjerg, and Sloan
offer two quite distinct proposals. Both schemes seek to increase the pre-
dictability and efficiency of tort law outcomes, but they have little else in
common. The first is a reporting scheme to facilitate the scheduling of dam-
ages. It would apply to all personal injury cases. The second is directed only
at cases of serious injury. It would supplant the usual lump sum award cover-
ing the costs of future health care, educational, social, and related long-term
support services, replacing that award with a series of contracts for these
future services to be negotiated by the parties.
In principle, both schemes offer attractive alternatives to the status quo,
and one hopes that policymakers will give each the most serious consideration.
For a variety of political and practical reasons, however, they would be
difficult to implement. Moreover, each of them would involve significant costs
that might well exceed the social benefits. (This seems especially true of the
second.) My brief comment on the Blumstein et al. paper is divided into three
parts. Part I sounds a note of realpolitik about "tort reform" and Parts II and
III appraise the merits of each of the proposals advanced by the authors.
I. A Little Realism About Tort Reformism2
The legislative changes to the tort system adopted during the last fifteen
years have given tort reform a bad name. They have been fueled more by
defendants' narrow desires to win their cases than by a balanced analysis of
the tort system aimed at serving a more broadly defined public interest. For
this reason, many of the measures adopted in the name of tort reform-arbi-
trary caps on pain and suffering awards, elimination of punitive damages, and
limits on contingent fees, for example-are undeniably crude, blunderbuss
remedies. They may achieve certain legitimate policy goals such as increasing
the availability of liability insurance;' it could hardly be otherwise given their
tSimeon E. Baldwin Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. Blumstein, Bovbjerg, & Sloan, Beyond Tort Reform: Developing Better Tools for Assessing
Damages for Personal Injury, 8 YALE J. ON REO. 171 (1991) [hereinafter Blumstein].
2. I borrow and adapt this phrase with apologies to Arthur Leff. See Leff, Some RealismAbout Nominal-
ism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974) (review of Posner's ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW).
3. See Blackmon & Zeckhauser, State Tort Reform Legislation: Assessing Our Control of Risks, in
TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND CONSUMER WELFARE (Schuck
ed.) (forthcoming 1991).
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reflexive, pro-defendant bias. In doing so, however, they almost completely
ignore deterrence, victim compensation, and other vital tort system goals.
By entitling their article "Beyond Tort Reform," Blumstein et al. pre-
sumably hope to launder their proposals ideologically, thereby immunizing
them from the pitched battles and protracted warfare that partisans have waged
under the rubric of tort reform. Here, as in their earlier article on damages
scheduling,4 they purport to reject the "radical" changes that some advocates
of tort reform propose in favor of two more modest approaches that seek
improvements "within the current framework of the tort-law system."'
These assurances, however, are unlikely to mollify the ever-vigilant sen-
tinels of the status quo, who are largely found among the plaintiffs' personal
injury bar and their allies in the consumer movement.6 If past'is prologue,
these battle-hardened combatants will view the authors' proposals not as
benign, incremental refinements of the system but rather as a thinly disguised
assault on some shibboleths of the traditional tort system: the jury's autonomy
and discretion, the victim's right to be made whole, and the law's demand for
individualized justice. This assault will be denounced in mammalian metaphors
for deceit: a wolf in sheep's clothing, a Trojan horse, a camel's nose under
the tent. The authors' careful disclaimer of radical intentions may succeed in
winning them a more respectful hearing by the plaintiffs' bar, but one has
reason to doubt that it will.
The staunch defender of the existing tort system will point out that
Blumstein et al. immediately reveal their true colors by disparaging as "wholly
ad hoc and discretionary" the traditional mode of determining damages.7 In
this mode, juries assess the victim's damages under a very general instruction
supplying little guidance or constraint, providing no information about damage
awards in earlier cases, and confounding both trial court control and appellate
court review. This mode, the authors point out, places no value on experience
or precedent, violates horizontal equity (the principle that like cases be treated
alike), weakens control and accountability, and magnifies uncertainty. This in
turn impedes settlements, discourages insurance, and increases litigation costs.
Traditionalists, however, are likely to view these features of the tort system
quite differently. Some will deny that these effects exist while others will insist
that they are exaggerated. Still others, conceding that these disadvantages are
great, will nevertheless maintain that they are necessary to achieve other, more
transcendant goals. In this view, ad hoc, discretionary damages determinations
protect the jury's independent, constitutionally enshrined fact-finding preroga-
4. Bovbjerg, Sloan & Blumstein, Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffering",
83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908 (1988-89).
5. Blumstein, supra note 1, at 172.
6. For one recent pronouncement nn behalf of this coalition, see Claybrook, Products Liability Serving
all Americans, 26 TRiAL 10 (1990).
7. Blumstein, supra note 1, at 173.
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tives from intrusion by judges and legislatures. Such decisions also safeguard
the victim's right to recover all that he has lost, not some fraction or approxi-
mation designed to achieve administrative efficiency rather than full compensa-
tion of loss. Most importantly, individualized jury determinations of damages
promote the law's most noble ambition-to vindicate individual rights by
producing exquisitely contextualized judgments tailored to the unique circum-
stances of each individual rather than mass produced according to crude
functional categories created to serve social needs.
The traditionalists will also resist the authors' proposal to substitute con-
tracts for services for lump sum or periodic awards of damages. Here the
objection will go to the proposal's paternalism or, in Jules Coleman's terms,
to its violation of the victim's autonomy by depriving her of "the right to
control her resources in a way that allows her to formulate and act upon life
plans. "'
Like most disputes over tort reform, the reactions to the authors' two
proposals will reflect ideological differences at least as much as they reflect
disagreements over what the facts are concerning the tort system's actual
effects. Even if these proposals produce a kind of normative standoff, they
raise fundamental questions of legal policy, questions which should be squarely
faced by reformers and traditionalists alike.
II. Damages Scheduling
The authors' first proposal addresses the question of how damages should
be assessed. The authors insist that the current process of damage determina-
tion is seriously deficient, and they present considerable empirical evidence
to support their claim. 9 A recent New York City case, which was decided
after Blumstein et al. wrote their paper, tends to buttress their general
point-although it surely is an aberration. The plaintiff, employed as a dish-
washer, was on a subway platform, apparently in an intoxicated condition.
8. Coleman, Adding Institutional Insults to Personal Injury, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 223 (1991). It should
be noted that objections based on paternalism and autonomy also apply to governmental programs such
as food stamps, Medicaid, and public housing that provide claimants with in-kind rather than cash benefits.
A corrective justice theorist like Coleman would surely argue that the offense to autonomy is greater in
the tort law context where the benefit is premised on a wrongfully imposed loss to the victim, than in the
public program context where the remedy is premised on policy goals such as redistribution to the poor.
In the programmatic context, unlike the tort context, no generally accepted principle of justice requires
that government create and enforce an entitlement to the benefit. In this context, moreover, political
considerations often necessitate an explicitly paternalistic remedial form like an in-kind benefit even at the
expense of individual autonomy.
9. Bovbjerg, supra note 4, at 919-28. Although the data relied on by Blumstein et al. demonstrates
that variations in awards are large and difficult to explain on the basis of differences in the circumstances
surrounding individual cases, the data can not conclusively establish that those variations are arbitrary and
illegitimate. Thus, the authors concede that "it is not possible to fully and objectively adjust for other
circumstances that plausibly influence a jury's valuation, such as the subjective nature of how an injury
occurred." Id. at 923-24.
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According to the New York Times account of the testimony, the token clerk
called the station command center, as required by transit agency rules, and
reported that an intoxicated person was on the platform. Fifteen to twenty
minutes later, the plaintiff fell on the tracks, was struck by a train, and suf-
fered injuries that resulted in the loss of his left arm. A Bronx jury awarded
him $9.3 million: $8.6 million for future pain and suffering, $514,800 for
future-lost wages, $16,875 for past lost wages, $200,000 for pain and suffer-
ing, and $17,055 for medical expenses. The Times noted that previous awards
against the Transit Authority for negligence resulting in loss of a person's
dominant arm had ranged between $1.25 million and $1.5 million.'o
It is simply impossible to square such an outcome with any defensible
conception of justice. The jury's award appears to deviate wildly from awards
to other plaintiffs who have suffered roughly comparable losses, creating the
severe problem of "horizontal inequity" that, among other concerns, has
prompted the authors' proposals." Awards of this size for losses of this kind
also invite over-deterrence, encouraging transit systems to engage in elaborate
precautions that are not worth their cost. The risk of such accidents becomes
uninsurable. Such awards also seem distributionally perverse; if they are
financed through subway fares, they ultimately impose the liability costs on
subway passengers, who are presumably poorer than the average. The possibil-
ity that the trial or appellate court will subsequently reduce an award like this
mitigates these problems, but it cannot eliminate them. The defendant's motion
for remittitur requires more litigation and entails additional uncertainties.
Blumstein et al. propose to rectify this situation through the use of damages
schedules.' 2 The authors would establish a system designed to generate much
more detailed damages findings from tort juries, record and aggregate that
information, and inform and instruct future juries concerning the range of
damages awarded in prior cases of the same kind. In particular, the infor-
mation would be used to constrain jury discretion; damages awards that fall
within a specified range of prior awards for the injury severity category
10. Sims, $9 Million Won for Loss of Arm in Drunken Fall, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1990, §B, at 3,
col. 6.
11. Indeed, the jury's valuation of the lost arm also exceeds, by a factor of two or three, conventional
valuations of loss of life in wrongful death cases and in regulatory decisions. See Bovbjerg, supra note
4, at 918. Note that I am not suggesting that injuries cannot sometimes properly be valued at more than
life, especially when the victim faces many years of expensive medical care, severe disability, and horrible
pain. The loss of an arm, terrible as that is, hardly seems like such a case.
12. This general approach is already employed in several closely analogous contexts, notably workers'
compensation and Social Security disability awards. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983).
Broad compensation categories are also common in first-party indemnity insurance and in the diagnosis-
related groups (DRGs) used to reimburse physicians under the Medicare program. See Altman, Hospital
Cu~s Aren't Hurting Care for Elderly, Study Says, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1990, §A, at 1, col. 5 (recent
study of DRGs' effects on the quality of care). In the specific context of tort adjudication, damage
scheduling has recently attracted the interest of other commentators. See e.g., Levin, Pain and Suffering
Guidelines: A Cure for Damages Measurement *Anomie," 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 303 (1989); Rosenberg,
Damage Scheduling in Mass Exposure Cases, in 3 CoURTS, HEALTH SCIENCE AND THE LAW 335 (1991).
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relevant to the particular accident would enjoy "presumptive validity," while
awards that fall outside that range would have to be justified by the jury.
This scheme is attractive at several levels. Very broad jury discretion may
be a virtue in the criminal law context in which the power of nullification is
viewed as an important safeguard against the state's punitive power. 3 Such
discretion is more objectionable, however, in the context of awards of tort
damages, where the law is equally concerned about fairness to plaintiffs and
to defendants and where there is no independent value in the possibility of
nullifying legal norms. Moreover, damages decisions by juries, remittitur and
additur decisions by trial courts, and reviewing decisions by appellate courts
are more likely to be fair and accurate if they are based on reliable information
about awards in prior cases. To the extent that the authors' system would
increase the predictability of awards, it would also encourage settlements,
reduce litigation and insurance costs, improve deterrence, and promote insur-
ability of risks. Awards like that in the New York City case described above
would have to be either justified explicitly or eliminated altogether. An addi-
tional benefit, not mentioned by the authors, is that the damages data generated
by their system could be used by administrative regulators who must make
policy decisions involving the valuation of life and limb.
The scheduling scheme, however, raises a number of conceptual and
practical problems. The value of the data for scheduling purposes depends
entirely on the notion of "similar cases."14 If this phrase is intended to mean
all cases within one of the nine severity-of-injury categories, it is too crude
to be very useful. For example, it would not discriminate among cases accord-
ing to any of the other variables, such as the victim's age"5 and the precise
duration of injury, 6 which contribute to legitimate variations in damages
awards. (The authors do envision an adjustment of prior awards for the extent
of comparative negligence and inflation.) 7 If the phrase "similar cases" is
meant to refer instead to some other criteria of similarity, we are not told what
those criteria might be. In principle, at least, this problem need not be insuper-
able, as more numerous case categories could be constructed pursuant to more
13. See M. KADISH & R. KADISH, THE DIscRETION TO DISOBEY (1973).
14. The authors also speak of "similar states" in connection with the pooling of data on damages
awards. Blumstein, supra note 1, at 180. Like the concept of similar cases, this phrase begs two central
questions. First, it does not indicate the respects in which similarity should be judged. Second, regardless
of how one proposes to answer that question, it can only be answered as a practical matter after one has
compiled state-specific data basis, at which point most of the advantages of multi-state data pooling can
no longer be obtained.
15. In their earlier article on damages scheduling, the authors emphasize the importance of this
variable. See Bovbjerg, supra note 4, at 919-28.
16. The injury severity categories that the scheme would employ use only two very broad durational
concepts-"temporary" and "permanent"-and death. Bovbjerg, supra note 4, at 921.
17. Blumstein, supra note 1, at 180.
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refined criteria of similarity. In practice, however, data, cost, and reliability
limitations might make this refinement impossible.
The data's value would also seem to depend on the comprehensiveness of
the reporting system. This in turn would depend on whether it includes infor-
mation on out-of-court settlements. It is not just that settlements constitute well
over 95% of the cases; it is also that the cases selected for litigation are
systematically different than those selected for settlement. 8 The authors fully
recognize this fact, yet their brief discussion of the issue' 9 reinforces, rather
than dispels, one's doubt that the system could generate reliable data of this
kind without considerable regulation of settlements, which would raise still
other policy problems.
The proposed reporting system would also rely entirely on damages data
drawn from earlier cases. Indeed, the authors view this fact as a plus, for it
helps to keep their approach "within the framework of the current tort-law
system."2 This may well be advantageous to their efforts to win political
acceptance of the proposal by the plaintiffs' bar. But by using earlier awards
as the foundation for their new system of damages scheduling, they impound
and then compound what they themselves characterize as the distortions of the
past, thereby projecting those distortions into the future. There may be no way
to eliminate this problem entirely; it can probably best be addressed by careful-
ly narrowing the range of prior awards within which new awards will enjoy
"presumptive validity."21
Another important set of implementation difficulties with the authors'
scheduling scheme grows out of the necessity for each jury to make damages-
related findings of fact that would be far more detailed than the Delphic,
conclusory findings it must make under the existing system. The new findings
would include not only the additional breakdowns required by the reporting
system, but also the mandated explanations for any awards that lie outside the
permissible range prescribed for each severity-of-injury category. T h e
requirement to make such findings raises at least two important problems.
First, juries that find it possible to agree upon the general kind of damages
assessment called for by current law would often find it harder, perhaps even
impossible, to reach agreement on the far more detailed findings demanded
by the authors' scheduling scheme. Other things remaining equal, an increase
in the level of specificity required of jury findings22 will generate a number
of other changes in the system. For example, more lawyering will be conduct-
18. See Priest & Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). But
see Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J.
LEGAL STUD. 337 (1990).
19. Blumstein, supra note 1, at 181.
20. Id. at 172.
21. Id. at 178.
22. The level of specificity issue is a significant one not fully addressed by the authors.
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ed around these issues, jury deliberations will become more protracted, and
the deliberations will more often result in hung juries, in which event retrial
of at least the damages portion of the case might be necessary. The prospect,
then, is for more expensive litigation, more court congestion, and more
divisiveness on juries.
A second problem is that a special verdict would be required in each case
of serious injury. In this connection, it is noteworthy that although special
verdicts are permissible under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' and
state law counterparts, and despite their theoretical attractiveness, they are
seldom employed in tort cases. Evidently, neither lawyers nor judges like
them. Their antipathy presumably reflects the fact that special verdict questions
are hard for judges to draft and for juries to answer. The formulation of
questions and the provision of answers cause more divisiveness within the jury
and, by inviting appeals and reversals, increase the parties' litigation costs.24
III. Contracts for Future Services
Blumstein et al. also advocate a system under which the jury in a case of
serious injury would be required to determine the actual service outcomes to
which the plaintiff will be entitled, rather than placing a monetary value on
those services as it does now. Those outcomes would be defined in terms of
a specified package of future health care, educational, social, and other related
long-term support services provided over a specified period of time. Once the
plaintiffs services entitlement was confirmed after post-verdict motions, the
defendant would be required to fund a series of contracts that would pay for
or provide the necessary services as the need for them arises. These contracts,
with detailed implementing provisions, would be negotiated by the parties
(through their lawyers), subject to the jury's specifications, arbitration if neces-
sary, and the court's final approval. The authors furnish many ingenious
refinements and programmatic details-for example, provision in the contract
for termination prices and a species of final-offer arbitration-that will not
concern me here.25
Even in principle, the virtues of this proposal are less apparent than those
of damages scheduling. In part, they depend on an avowedly paternalistic
assumption that contract rights to future services are better than an immediate
lump sum payment because the latter might be squandered due to "improvi-
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a).
24. Stevens, Controlling the Civil Jury: Towards a Functional Model of Justification, 76 KY. L.J.
81 (1987-88).
25. Without getting into these details, I shall simply point out that some of them seem unnecessarily
constraining. For example, the proposal requires all future services to be bundled together, Blumstein, supra
note 1, at 195, despite the strong possibility that some specialization by insurers is more efficient.
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dence, ineffective management, or duplicity. "26 However, the authors fail
to explain why paternalism should be viewed as any more justified in the case
of personal injury victims deciding how to dispose of their resources than it
is in the case of other adults whom society presumes to be better able than the
state to decide such matters.27
The other major virtue that Blumstein et al. claim for their scheme is that
it would replace valuation by expert witnesses, whose testimony the authors
deem unreliable, with valuation by insurers, whose pricing 'should be more
accurate." What is less clear is why the authors assume that insurers would
bid to underwrite the service contracts but that plaintiffs armed with a lump
sum payment could not purchase such insurance in the market.29 If moral
hazard or adverse selection problems limit such a market, they should do so
equally under the authors' proposed system. It is difficult to see why insurers
would enjoy economies of scale in the purchase of such services unless they
can group a significant number of prevailing, similarly situated tort plaintiffs
together at the time of negotiating the service contract.
A less normative, more practical concern about the scheme relates to the
transaction costs that would be entailed in negotiating these contracts. Here,
as with the damages scheduling proposal, an important factor in determining
how and at what cost the scheme would operate is the level of detail with
which the jury prescribes the contract's specifications for future services. The
reason is that those specifications will define the constraints within which the
contract will be negotiated by the parties' lawyers, supplemented out by the
arbitrator, and enforced by the court. Greater detail by the jury should reduce
the transaction costs surrounding the subsequent negotiations and enforcement,
but that same detail will increase the jury's own transaction costs by making
its agreement on contract specifications more difficult.3
26. This is the authors' own characterization of the proposal. Blumstein, supra note 1, at 188.
27. A similar, in some ways even more egregious, instance of paternalism arises in connection with
policy decisions to require individuals who reach retirement age to take their pensions in the form of an
annuity rather than in the form of cash or some other arrangement that the retiree might prefer. For one
modification of this position, see PROVOST'S COMMITTEE ON RETIREMENT ISSUES, YALE UNIVERSITY, THE
ANNUITY PLAN AND BENEFITS FOR EARLY AND PHASED RETIREMENT (1990) (interim report).
28. Blumstein, supra note, at 194.
29. The authors simply state that "there is no market for such insurance to be purchased from cash
payments." Blumstein, supra note 1, at 194. Similarly, the assertion that the risks of "unanticipated
inflation" and "unanticipated technological change" are not diversifiable, Blumstein, supra note 1, at 202,
is unsupported. It is a truism, of course, that risks are not anticipated-that is, not recognized as risks-will
not be diversified away. It is not clear why, to the extent that they are recognized as risks, they cannot
be diversified away.
30. The authors say that "the jury should state the general nature of services needed," including the
type of institutionalization, attendant services, periodic or continuous care of certain kinds, and anticipated
duration of care. Blumstein, supra note 1, at 190. Later, they say that "juries can readily specify only broad
provisions," not the "numerous quality-cost tradeoffs." Blumstein, supra note 1, at 197.
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Conclusion
Blumstein et al. are to be commended for seeking superior alternatives to
the existing system of damage awards, one that is largely unconstrained by
doctrine and remarkably wasteful of potentially valuable information about
outcomes in similar cases. Although I perceive little advantage and much
difficulty with their contracts-for-services scheme, their damages scheduling
proposal stands on a different footing. The information on damages that they
propose to systematically collect, generate, and mobilize could both reduce the
costs of jury deliberations on damages and achieve greater horizontal equity.
To a great extent, however, the difficulties that I have identified with their
damages scheduling proposal will persist so long as the jury plays the central
role in awarding damages. Although the authors have deployed considerable
analytical skill and imagination in order to circumvent this obstacle, their goal
may simply be unrealizeable through this kind of marginal reform. To achieve
it, something like the British system, which abolished juries in almost all civil
cases, may be necessary. The radically individualistic ethos of American
society, together with the remarkable success of the plaintiffs' bar in persuad-
ing the public that the institution of the civil jury serves that individualism,
make such a change politically infeasible at this time. Whether reforms short
of abolition would on balance improve the system or not is a very important
policy question, one on which the authors have shed some penetrating light.

